We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally "switch" from anarchy to hierarchy -when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society's surplus for his own consumption.
relevant state of affairs for most of mankind's history -we have been mobile hunter-gatherers living from hand to mouth for millennia, and some societies still are. Such societies did not need (organized) defense to prevent others from stealing belongings. Other than the territory occupied for foraging, there was simply not much to steal. This situation changed after the agricultural transition, some 10,000 years ago for early farming societies (see Weisdorf 2005) . Along with several other major changes to the human lifestyle, this involved production of surpluses and storage of commodities in a systematic way (e.g., Fernandez-Armesto 2001) . Growing crops is a seasonal activity, so that reliance on storage is necessary to survive from one harvest to another.
Indeed, crops maturing in the field are also, to some degree, stored assets. While possibly efficient in terms of aggregate production, storage also opens the door to theft -enabling a new economic sector (one of thieves and raiders) to emerge. Anarchy, then, refers to a system of spontaneous order in which agents can seize and defend resources without regulation from above. From a situation of anarchy societies may evolve towards hierarchy, where defense decisions are made by a central authority to incorporate the positive external effects of defense. This likely happens when the gains from such a transition for the people exceed the costs.
How important is the presence of storage in provoking a transition to hierarchy and greater social organization for the purposes of defense? Anthropologists have long recognized that capacity for production and storing resources has a profound impact on the social structure of society, a transformation that is evident even when comparing hunter-gatherers. Woodburn (1982) , for example, draws a distinction between simple and complex hunter-gatherers. Complex huntergatherers featured some degree of hierarchy, admitted a degree of inequality among citizens and chiefs, and possessed economies that relied heavily on stored resources. They were also more likely to engage in organized warfare, own specific tracts of land, and practice slavery.
1 Kelly (1995, p. 311) , in his synopsis of the differences between simple and complex hunter-gatherers puts it succinctly: "… storage carries with it the seeds of conflict." Anthropologists have also invoked the link between storage and hierarchy at higher levels. In his classic text, Harris (1997, p. 295) points out that taxation is only possible if there is some degree of storage capacity present in the society, and also argues that there are greater possibilities for the development and maintenance of hierarchy in the presence of resources that are storable. The transition from amorphy to anarchy and on to hierarchy, triggered by the accumulation of wealth ('lootable assets'), implies an evolutionary trajectory characterized by (i) the absence of thieving and raiding, followed by (ii) the rise of thieving and raiding and decentralized defense levels, which in turns might give way to (iii) the emergence of hierarchic structure to provide efficient levels of law and order. The corollary is that in times of economic downturns and loss of assets, hierarchic societies may regress to anarchy. Indeed, there is evidence of this, too. For example, Bell (1971) links the rise and fall of Egyptian kingdoms to variations in affluence.
During years of prosperity, Egyptians were represented by a strong and wealthy kingship that upheld a stable society. But periods of economic misery (e.g. prolonged periods of drought) would cause kingships to break down. 3 Similar evidence exists for the fall of the Maya civilization and Roman Empire, and the plight of the society on Easter Island (see Diamond 2005) . Indeed, even up to the time of the Industrial Revolution, shifts between economic prosperity/misery and hierarchy/anarchy existed. Between 1560 and 1770, for example, England experienced "numerous 1 The classic example are the hunter-gatherer peoples of the Pacific Northwest of North America. Kelly (1995, p. 302) lists a few other societies that fit this mold, including some peoples of California, the Ainu in Japan, and the Calusa of Florida. 2 As an example, Harris (1997, p. 296) describes work in Earle (1989) , Hommon (1986) and Kirch (1984) on the origins and development of Hawaiian society, arguing that the lack of capacity to produce a storable grain inhibited the development of a larger, centralized state on the island chain. 3 For example, around 2180 BCE the Egyptian Kingdom, known as Dynasty VI, collapsed. During the following socalled Egyptian Dark Age, which lasted 20-25 years, "hardly any form of civil disorder was absent, ranging from strife between districts, to looting and killing … to individual crime run riot, to revolution and social anarchy" (ibid. p. 7).
periods of political turmoil, internal warfare, and important changes in political regimes" (Clark 1996, p. 568) .
This study provides a model that links technological progress to the existence of hierarchic structures upholding the rule of law. Kings or ruling elites (in what follows we use these terms interchangeably) can provide such a service and arguably represent the predecessor of nation states. Kings taxed their farmers to finance the provision of law and order, as well as their own consumption. While the political economy literature on the size distribution of nations mentioned above typically assumes a government maximizing the benefits of the median voter, we introduce a selfish ruler maximizing its own surplus. The tradeoff for the people, therefore, is not to balance efficiency gains (public goods) versus heterogeneity costs, as in most of the existing literature on jurisdictional size. Instead, they choose between being raided by thieves versus being taxed by a king. We analyze the economic incentives for the transition from anarchy to hierarchy against the backdrop of population growth and endogenous technical change in production.
There are two important prior contributions related to our work. 4 First, Usher (1989) provides a model of so-called dynastic cycles -alternating periods of peace and prosperity on the one hand, and chaos and decline on the other. A ruling elite provides socially optimal levels of defense, taking the public good nature of deterrence effort into account, bringing stability and setting the stage for populations to grow. However, diminishing returns to labor will eventually lower incomes (and taxable surplus), eventually undermining the incentive for a ruler to provide public goods. The result is a fall back into chaos and a decline in human population density, which in turn raises incomes. Eventually, sufficient taxable surplus warrants the re-entry of a new king.
An important difference between Usher (1989) and our work is that the transition from hierarchy to anarchy is the result of a choice by the ruler in Usher, whereas we assume the people make such choices.
Second, and closest to our work, Grossman (2002) considers the question whether producers are better off with centralized defenses organized by a ruler or with decentralized defense in a situation of anarchy. We extend Grossman's approach along three dimensions. First, we employ a conventional conflict, or contest, function to describe the interaction between producers and raiders, and hence the benefits from a switching towards hierarchy. Second, we develop a dynamic model where population size and the level of technology evolve endogenously so that we can analyze the evolution of anarchy to hierarchy. Unlike Grossman, our model suggests the existence of multiple stable equilibria, underdevelopment traps in anarchy, and so on.
Third, we explore some of the model's implications using an existing dataset on lifestyle and material culture of indigenous peoples at various stages of development (the Standard CrossCultural Sample, or SCCS dataset). Among other things, this data includes information on the technological sophistication and governance structure of a varied group of peoples, both past and present.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, as a motivating exercise, we demonstrate several empirical relationships between population density, the state of technology, and the state of hierarchy. In Section 3 we present the static model. We start off by introducing the anarchic case of a society without a ruler, and then analyze the consequences of introducing a selfish king. We compare payoffs for producers, and determine the conditions under which a king would be voted into office. In Section 4 we introduce population growth and technological change and consider the dynamics of institutional development in more detail. We interpret our specification of technical change as the gradual transition from foraging to early agriculture, and the accompanying emergence of stored (and hence 'lootable') commodities. In section 5 we present and discuss the main results. Finally, section 6 concludes.
A Cross-Cultural Portrait of the Evolution of Hierarchy
In this section, we describe how the emergence of hierarchy relates to some of the most basic characteristics of the economy. The evidence we present is intended to motivate our theoretical presentation and provide the reader some insights into how hierarchy apparently emerges from anarchy. Since we seek to discuss the evolution of hierarchy from a state in which there is no higher authority or government, it is useful to employ data that allows comparison of societies in which there is no form of higher government with societies in which some hierarchy exists. Our approach is to study the incidence of hierarchy in a cross-section of different cultures.
We employ the Standard Cross Cultural Sample (henceforth SCCS), an extensive and welldocumented cross-cultural data set originally developed in the work of Murdock and White (1969 We seek to offer evidence in support of the position that technological sophistication and, in particular, the presence of storage, are important determinants of hierarchy, and also that an important function of a hierarchy is policing. Thus, we employ a set of variables in the SCCS to measure technological sophistication, including the degree to which writing and record-keeping are present in a society, a measure of task specialization, a measure of whether or not storage and retention of surplus output is present in a particular society, and the contribution of agriculture to the food supply. 9 These variables, along with some other variables (which serve as instruments in some of our regressions), are described in Table 1 . The SCCS also contains some limited information on the function of the state, and we include some information on whether or not police are present or absent. police presence dummy and the presence of hierarchy is 0.68 (significant at 1%).
< Tables 1 and 2 about here > To get a better feel for the relationship between hierarchy and technology, and in light of the fact that the technological variables plainly increase together, we have also constructed a univariate index of technology using principal components. The index is assembled from the first principal component of the three variables measuring technological specialization, agricultural importance and sophistication, and the presence of writing and record keeping. The first principal component captures a strongly positive association between the three variables and explains about 64 percent of the joint variation in the three variables. 10 We take this to mean that in one common dimension the overall level of technology in the society is increasing. We refer to the index so rating the levels of sovereignty present in each society is also included in the SCCS. Our measure is heavily correlated with this variable (correlation coefficient of .77, significant at 1% level).
constructed from this first principal component as "the level of technology," or more succinctly, "technology." The resulting technology index has a mean of zero (by design), a minimum value of -2.34, and a maximum value of 2.40. A society for which the technology value is close to the lower limit can be thought of as one with a low reliance on agriculture, little or no record keeping and writing, and little task specialization. We maintain our fourth technological variable, measuring the presence or absence of storage, separately as we hope to offer some evidence that this variable is an important determinant of hierarchy independent of the behavior of the other measures of technology. But what roles do technology, population density, and storage play in the emergence of hierarchy? It seems reasonable to posit that hierarchy, population density, and technology are all jointly determined. As we shall argue in the theoretical section of the paper, the adoption of hierarchy has consequences for the types of technology that may be used and the population density that may be sustained by a given society. Thus, a more rigorous theoretical analysis must rely on some sort of instrumentation strategy. Along these lines, consider once again Map 1, where societies that are 'hierarchical' according to our dichotomous variable are marked with squares or rectangles, while non-hierarchical societies are marked with circles. It is fairly clear from the geographical distribution that those societies that are hierarchical appear to be grouped closer to historical centers of civilization, and also appear to be centered in areas in which the environment might be considered richer.
weights, suggesting that a simple sum of these variables might also function quite well as an index of technological specialization.
Measures of environmental quality like those described in Table 1 should have little direct impact on the emergence and development of hierarchy. Environmental factors should work through other variables by allowing higher population density, which in turn impacts the adoption and creation of more sophisticated technologies. Thus, it seems reasonable to use as instruments for population density and technology underlying environmental characteristics. These environmental variables are described on table 1. One cannot be sure, however, from Map 1 that the clustering of hierarchical societies is due solely to similar population density and environment.
To further control for this closeness and to allow for the possibility that hierarchical forms of government are learned and adopted from neighbors, we include the distance measures described in This evidence is merely meant to be suggestive of a few fundamental features of some of the root determinants of the degree of hierarchy in a society, and is not intended to be a rigorous test. Nevertheless, it is worth summarizing what we consider to be the crucial points that one may take from this data. First, there appears to be a relationship between the presence of hierarchy and policing. Second, hierarchy appears in part to be caused by greater degrees of technological sophistication and the presence of storage surpluses. Third, when addressing the endogeneity through instrumentation, it does not appear that population density is a crucial factor in driving the evolution of hirerachies. In the subsequent sections, we lay out a model that describes how this process might work, and that is consistent with these 'stylized facts'.
The Static Model

The case of anarchy
Consider a society or group of n members, some of which earn a living as a producer (or early farmer) and others are supporting themselves by raiding producers, taking part of their output.
People are risk neutral and amoral, preferring to become thieves whenever that profession is more profitable than producing. The total population is described as follows:
where n f denotes the number of producers, and n r denotes the number of raiders in society. Each raider devotes his entire endowment of time (one unit) to raiding. In contrast, producers split their time between production and defense effort to protect their output from raiders. The time constraint for producers is given by
where l is labor devoted to production and d is defense effort by the producer.
There are two inputs in production, land and labor. The production function is given
, where β, μ ≤ 1. Land is available in fixed supply, and we normalize the total land base to unity. After career choices, each producer is allotted an equal share of available land upon which to produce, so each producer receives (1/n f ) units of land. To simplify the analysis and exposition, and without affecting the qualitative results, we set μ=1 in what follows so that the production function for any producer, net of any theft of output, is given by:
In equation (2), A is a parameter measuring the state of technology (which will be made endogenous below) and s is the share of output retained by the producer. We specify the contest or share function as follows:
where the parameter θ is a proxy for (lack of) security and measures the ease with which output can be stolen. This parameter must take on values less than one-half, as will become evident below. This share function is consistent with the idea that all raiders devote all of their efforts to theft, and each farmer bears an equal fraction of total raiding effort. Using the time constraint and the share function, producers' payoffs are defined as:
where Ψ = n r /n f , or the ratio of raiders to producers in the economy. Under autarky, each producer chooses defense efforts to maximize (4) while taking the number of raiders in the population as
given. The optimal choice of defense is simply:
Plugging (5) into (4) gives the following expression for the optimal return to producing and defending for any combination of raiding and producing, n r and n f , in the economy:
Next, consider the payoffs for raiders. Assuming each raider gets an equal share of the total 'take', these payoffs consist of the total resources stolen from producers divided by the number of raiders:
Using the equilibrium value of defense in (5), we have: In equilibrium, people are indifferent between producing and raiding so that the returns from each career choice should be the same. Equating (6) and (8) results in the following expression for the ratio of raiders to producers in the economy (or the raid ratio):
the literature. A more general specification would raise contest effort of raiders and farmers to a certain power R. Baye et al. (1994) demonstrate that a symmetric Nash equilibrium then exists, even for R>2.
Hence, the fraction of raiders in the population only depends on security parameter θ . Amorphy, as defined by Hirschleifer, thus occurs in the special case where θ =0. As θ increases, so does the relative number of raiders. When θ =½, all agents prefer to be raiders and per capita income in the economy has completely evaporated. In equilibrium, we have the following number of producers:
(10)
The returns to productive labor are given by:
An .
Upon substituting (10) in (11) we get an expression for equilibrium income of raiders and farmers:
(12)
Note that the returns in (12) depend upon the degree of security present in society, and in particular go to zero as θ goes to ½. We now investigate how these outcomes are affected when a potential king enters the scene.
The case of hierarchy
Following Grossman (2002) , under hierarchy, the ruler organizes defense on behalf of everybody in society. While individual people still use their own effort to protect their output, the ruler decides on the allocation of time between production and defense. 13 The key difference with anarchy is that the king takes into account that the number of raiders is endogenous with respect to the level of defense. In other words, the ruler internalizes the external effect that raising defense induces some raiders to become producers instead, as opposed to the decision of individual agents 13 In what follows we ignore problems of free riding and cheating, and simply assume that the ruler is able to force "his people" to the optimal allocation of time. For an early discussion of this simplification, refer to Williamson (1973) .
that just balances foregone production versus the share of output that can be retained. However, the king also reserves the right to collect taxes, and the cost of hierarchy is that the hierarch is concerned about his own welfare when setting taxes. The payoffs to being a producer are now defined as:
where H d denotes the centralized level of defense and τ is the tax rate chosen by the hierarch.
Assuming only legitimate activities are subject to taxation, the returns to being a raider are now given by:
The hierarch must set the level of defense and tax rate so that the following condition is satisfied:
otherwise, he collects no tax revenues. Equation (15) reduces to the following condition:
The total tax revenues collected by the hierarch are then defined by
hierarch chooses defense to maximize tax revenues subject to a "participation constraint" (16), or the condition that people prefer to produce rather than to raid. Note this choice involves an elementary tradeoff. While the government wishes to raise the tax rate, he is restricted in his ability to do so by the fact that raising taxes implies he should simultaneously mandate higher levels of defense (which comes at the expense of foregone production). The reason is that raising the tax rate makes a "switch" to raiding more attractive, ceteris paribus, which must be offset by an increase in defenses. The solution to the hierarch's problem is:
Not surprisingly, centralized defense levels are higher than the anarchic level of defenses, reflecting that the king considers the impact of defense decisions on career choice while individual producers do not.
14 Plugging in the optimal value of τ and H d into (11) gives the following expression for producers' income under a ruler:
We can now solve for the critical security level where people are indifferent between being raided and taxed by equating (12) and (18). The critical parameter is defined by the following condition:
Since the right-hand-side, RHS, of (21) While this model is suited for discussing the tradeoff between autarky and an appropriative government, it says nothing about how the degree of government is influenced by population and technological progress, or about the different possible phases in the development process of societies over time. A dynamic model is necessary to consider these issues.
A Dynamic Model
We now introduce equations of motion to capture the intertemporal development of population size and the state of technology. Following Galor (2005) and others, we assume that technical progress is one of the main drivers of the model, and aim to capture the process of innovation and depreciation (erosion) of the state of technology as follows:
The first term on the RHS captures innovations and the second term captures erosion of technology (δ denotes a depreciation parameter). The specification in (20) assumes the state of technology is increasing in the current state of technology, A, and in the population of producers which may be due to some 'innovation by doing' argument, or because higher population density allows for a faster exchange of ideas, etc. (e.g. Shekhar et al., 2006) . Although this is not important for the model that follows, we envisage the gradual increase in A over time as the gradual transition from foraging to early farming.
One implication of 0 > A is that output becomes easier to steal -increases in output (surpluses) not only imply that guarding output becomes harder, theft may also be facilitated due to changes in the nature of production. For example, if producers rely more on harvesting produce that they have planted or sown themselves, then raiders may have relatively easy access to the stock when it is on the field. This means it is realistic to assume that the security parameter θ is not invariant with respect to technology levels. We capture this idea by assuming a linear relation between the state of technology and the ease with which output can be stolen (the results are robust with respect to alternative monotonic relationships):
where z is just a scaling parameter. In line with the earlier discussions on threshold values for the security parameter θ , specification (21) defines an upper limit on productivity for the anarchy and hierarchy models to be sensible -respectively Equations (22a) and (22b) imply that, at A=A*, there is a discontinuity in the 0 = A isocline, which jumps downwards then (note 0 < (1-zA)/(1-2zA) < 1).
Specification of a population growth process completes the system's dynamics. Following a large literature on early economic civilizations (e.g. Brander and Taylor 1998, Horan et al. 2005) we describe population dynamics by a simple Malthusian process:
where ϕ is a population growth parameter, i denotes anarchy or hierarchy, and S is a food intake threshold (minimum caloric intake for self-maintenance). For π < S, the population shrinks and for π > S it grows. We ignore the king's income as his fertility decisions are relatively unimportant relative to those of the population at large, and use the people's income as provided in (12) and (18) (but qualitatively similar outcomes obtain if we would base the analysis on total income in the economy). Condition (23) is readily solved for the 0 = n isocline by setting π = S and, again, there are 2 distinct isocline segments depending on whether A is greater or smaller than A*. The isocline segments for anarchy and hierarchy, respectively, are given by:
, and
With these building blocks in place, we can now turn to an analysis of the dynamics of population growth and technical change, and the consequences for institutional change.
Model results
Before we analyze the dynamics and steady states in some detail, it is instructive to consider the impact of technical change on some of the model's key variables in equilibrium.
In Figure 1 we demonstrate that the anarchic raid ratio (ψ), or the number of raiders divided by their victims, increases as the state of technology increases. While an increase in productivity increases the returns to both producing and raiding (so that the net effect is neutral) 15 , there is an additional effect due to the assumption that the production and storage of surpluses enhances the ease with which output can be stolen -tipping the balance in favor of becoming a raider. The net effect of technical change on income of producers and raiders is ambiguous, depending on the level of technical change (see Figure 3 below ). Technical change raises the value marginal product of labor allocated to production, but since fewer people actually produce the net effect on income is unclear. Specifically, if we consider the case where society is in anarchy before and after the 15 Note that the argument A does not appear in (9) -the raid ratio is only a function of security parameter θ.
increase in A (so that equation (12) 
, which is the case whenever A > 1/4z, or when the raid ratio curve is sufficiently steep (see Figures   1 and 3 ).
< Figure 1 about here > Next, consider the case of hierarchy. In Figure 2 we show that an increase in the state of technology lowers the equilibrium tax rate. Since technical progress makes raiding more attractive, the ruler aims to neutralize the incentive to switch from producing to raiding, and lowering the tax rate so that producers can retain a larger share of their output is one approach to doing this. An alternative approach to restoring the balance between producing and raiding would be to raise the levels of defense, but this comes at the cost of foregone production. To find the optimal tax rate, the ruler balances the foregone profit share from low taxes versus the foregone output from raising defense levels. Hence, while technical advances ambiguously impact on producers' income under conditions of anarchy, when ruled by a king it makes producers unambiguously better off -it allows them to retain a greater share of a larger pie. One may use Figure 3 we provide equilibrium income for anarchic and hierarchical societies. As explained above, the relation between the state of technology and income under anarchy is nonmonotonous. The critical level of technology A*, and the associated critical security parameter θ*, is defined by the unique interior intersection of the two income curves.
< Figure 3 about here >
Analysis of the dynamic system
The analysis until now implies that simple models with exogenous technical change (i.e., where σ is a parameter) will necessarily undergo the transition from anarchy to hierarchy: eventually the level of technology will be sufficiently high to elect a king in power. Is this also true for our dynamic model with endogenous technical change? The answer is no. For different parameter combinations we obtain qualitatively different results. In what follows we illustrate this important point by presenting two interesting cases.
In Figure 4 we provide the phase plane for one possible configuration of parameters, providing the isoclines as derived in (22) and (24). 16 On the horizontal axis the state of technology is depicted, and the vertical axis provides population numbers (or density). As before, A* denotes the critical technology level, so that for A < A* the anarchy segments (22a, 24a) are relevant, and for A > A* the hierarchy segments (22b, 24b). The present configuration has two potentially stable interior steady states: in both the anarchy and hierarchy sectors of the phase plane the 0 = A isocline cuts the 0 = n isocline from below, which implies that each steady state is a focus or node. The stability of the steady states depends on the relative slopes of the isoclines, and may be analyzed further by examining the eigenvalues of the linearized system in equilibrium.
< Figure 4 about here >
The existence of a potentially stable steady state in the anarchy sector implies that societies may "get stuck" to the left of A* and never elect a king. These low-tech societies prefer to go untaxed and provide defense on a decentralized basis. We interpret these societies with low productivity levels and little or no storage of commodities as stable foragers' societies. Other societies, however, will cross the security (or productivity) threshold -possibly because the trajectories cycle outward. Depending on the trajectory, such societies will eventually support a king providing efficient levels of security, or cycle back towards the anarchic segment. Indeed, as in Usher (1989) it may be feasible to have 'dynastic cycles' where societies grow and collapse and undergo periodic phases of anarchy. 17 The model predicts farmers' societies where storable and 'lootable' surpluses are produced will settle down in the hierarchic steady state. This is a prediction that is amenable to empirical testing in section 5.
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The phase plane suggests that societies are more likely to become hierarchical if the initial level of technology is 'high' (i.e. close to the threshold) or if the population is 'large.' 19 In contrast, societies with few people are likely to evolve towards anarchy, even if their initial level of technology places them to the right of the threshold. The reason is that such societies will gradually lose their level of technical sophistication as new innovations fail to keep pace with the erosion of knowledge (similar to the findings in Shekhar et al., 2006) . As an interesting aside, while population size is important during the transition phase, the model predicts that equilibrium population size of the anarchy and hierarchy steady state cannot be unambiguously ranked.
Indeed, for the combination of parameters underlying Figure 4 we find that the hierarchical society is smaller than the anarchic one. Again, this is a model implication that may be amenable to empirical testing.
In Figure 5 we present an alternative phase plane based on a different set of parameters.
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This is the case where the 0 = A isocline cuts the 0 = n isocline from below in the anarchy sector (as before), and from above in the hierarchy sector of the phase plane. The anarchy steady state is again a focus or node, but the hierarchic steady state is now a saddle point. The separatrix 16 To be precise, Figure 4 is based on z=1, α=0. 3, β=0.3, δ=0.9, γ=0.2, ν=1.0 and S=0.205. 17 But unlike the model of Usher, the dynamics are not governed by diminishing returns in production and a king that voluntarily steps down -it is driven by cycles of population abundance that affect productivity levels and the ease with which output can be stolen (affecting the incentives of the people to support a king, or not). 18 An additional effect, not captured by the model, is that agriculture and storage facilitate financing a hierarch as it makes it much easier to collect taxes: agricultural output is readily observable, and storage enables accumulatation of resources to pay for taxes. 19 The intuition for the latter is evident: if societies start sufficiently "high" in the phase plane, they will necessarily cross the A = A* threshold. The reason is that technical change occurs at a rapid rate in societies with many people.
Even if the population "shrinks", the level is high enough to induce a transition from foraging to early agriculture. 20 Figure 5 is based on z=1, α=0. 135, β=0.3, δ=0.9, γ=0.9, ν=1.0 and S=0.15. associated with the saddle point divides the hierarchy sector in two parts -below the separatrix the system is pushed (back) towards anarchy, above if the system is pushed on a path of sustained growth where population increases and technical mutually increase each other. In other words, an anarchic society that faces a sufficiently large (temporary) productivity shock -say, a climatic shock or significant technical innovation (possibly through technology import) -will face a fundamentally different future. This will happen if due to the shock the system "jumps" above the separatrix. Not only will it elect a king in power, it will also experience sustained growth where population growth spurs technical change, and where the income increase following technical change permits Malthusian style population growth.
< Figure 5 about here > This is not intended as an exhaustive analysis of all potential dynamic outcomes. For example, some parameter values imply the anarchic steady state disappears (i.e., the isoclines do not intersect for values of A below A*) and others imply it changes into a saddle point. The latter possibility suggests that for some initial conditions (specifically: for starting points below the anarchy separatrix) society will become trapped in a vicious circle of population decline and technical regression, and eventually go extinct. For other initial conditions, of course, the transition to hierarchy is inevitable. Detailed knowledge about underlying parameters of societies is necessary to predict the qualitative nature of its long-term fate.
Discussion and Conclusions
Why do some societies evolve from anarchy to hierarchy, and why do other societies fail to make that transition? We propose a novel explanation by focusing on internal conflict (raiding) and the tradeoffs between decentralized and centralized levels of defense. While centralized levels of defense are efficient -taking external effects into account -and increase total output relative to anarchic equilibrium levels, there is an associated cost for producers as the ruling elite is capable to tax away part of the surplus for its own consumption. The main result of the paper is that producers prefer to be taxed, rather than be raided, if production technology is sufficiently advanced. Using a dynamic model with endogenous population and technology we demonstrate that the evolution from anarchy to hierarchy is possible, but not inevitable -some (foraging)
societies will prefer to stay egalitarian and anarchic.
Our empirical analysis, based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample, supports the model's main predictions. Using OLS and IV estimation techniques we find that technology levels are an important driver of the degree of hierarchy in indigenous cultures, and that 'storage' plays a particularly important role in this respect. The latter result makes perfect sense in the context of our model because, in line with several anthropologists, we argue that the ability to store output is one of the main determinants of raiding and conflict (enhancing the appeal of efficient levels of defense). Consistent with the theory model, our empirical work also downplays the role of population size as a determining factor in the emergence of hierarchic structures. The potential efficiency gains from centralized public good provision are therefore not necessarily an overriding concern for community members when deciding about whether to elect a king, or not.
The theoretical model is very stylized and ignores many salient features of reality. For example, we don't consider that some communities may be able to coordinate on optimal levels of defenses in the absence of a ruler, or that security parameter θ may be subject to technical change (related to technical advances in production, or otherwise). We also ignore the issue of external conflict -including fights over territories of different communities -which may clearly provide an important impetus for centralized organization of defense (see Baker 2003) . Finally, by assuming all community members have identical skills we assume away that there may be internal conflict over whether to switch from anarchy to hierarchy, or not. Members that are more productive than others, or have access to more productive land, will prefer to make the transition at some lower critical value of technology. This could result in societies "breaking up" or in some faction imposing its will on another. Analyzing these issues, and others, is left for future work.
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=1 if closest to another original hearth of agriculture (Northeastern U. S., Central America, South China) Baker (2005) Distance from closest hearth Calculated using society coordinates in SCCS, with the Northeastern U. S., Central America, and South China as other hearths.
Baker (2005) "Vertical" distance from fertile crescent Calculated to be miles north or south from fertile crescent.
Baker ( Notes: * significant at 10%, **=significant at 5%, ***= significant at 1%. In the case in which an instrumental variables regression is reported, the instruments used are the environmental and geographical variables (described in table 1). Standard IV estimates are obtained using GMM to allow for heteroskedasticity of unknown form. Probit IV estimates are obtained using a two-step estimator.
